Consider a group of colluders each with certain knowledge such as identity of some other colluders, some cryptographic keys, and some data, possibly multiply encrypted. Two colluders can combine their knowledge if their current knowledge satis es certain condition. Their cryptographic keys can help decrypt each other's encrypted data, expanding their knowledge and revealing more collusion opportunities, and the process of collusion continues. The question we address is whether it is possible for them to uncover a target set of unencrypted data. In this paper we formulate the collusion problem and provide an algorithm that determines whether a collusion problem has a solution and if so, computes one. A solution is a speci c way by which the colluders can uncover the hidden information. The solution generated by our algorithm is generally not one that involves the minimum number of colluders. We show however that to nd such a solution is NP-complete. Complex communications protocols employing cryptographic building blocks are being developed to transfer information among some users and hide from others. The algorithm presented here can be applied to determine whether and how a subset of protocol users can discover during or after the protocol's execution the information that is to be hidden from them.
Abstract
Consider a group of colluders each with certain knowledge such as identity of some other colluders, some cryptographic keys, and some data, possibly multiply encrypted. Two colluders can combine their knowledge if their current knowledge satis es certain condition. Their cryptographic keys can help decrypt each other's encrypted data, expanding their knowledge and revealing more collusion opportunities, and the process of collusion continues. The question we address is whether it is possible for them to uncover a target set of unencrypted data. In this paper we formulate the collusion problem and provide an algorithm that determines whether a collusion problem has a solution and if so, computes one. A solution is a speci c way by which the colluders can uncover the hidden information. The solution generated by our algorithm is generally not one that involves the minimum number of colluders. We show however that to nd such a solution is NP-complete. Complex communications protocols employing cryptographic building blocks are being developed to transfer information among some users and hide from others. The algorithm presented here can be applied to determine whether and how a subset of protocol users can discover during or after the protocol's execution the information that is to be hidden from them.
List of Symbols k lowercase \kay" lowercase epsilon uppercase sigma lowercase sigma uppercase delta lowercase delta lowercase rho lowercase lambda uppercase theta lowercase phi (also denotes null set) union subset or equal Consider a group of colluders each knowing certain information such as identity of some other colluders, some cryptographic keys, and some data, possibly multiply encrypted. Two colluders can combine their knowledge provided their current knowledge satis es certain condition. A colluder's cryptographic key can help decrypt the encrypted data in the other colluder's possession, expanding its knowledge. This may reveal even more decryption keys and new collusion opportunities, and the process of collusion continues. The question we address is whether it is possible for them to uncover a target set of unencrypted data. This is motivated by the recent proliferation of complex communications protocols employing cryptographic building blocks that are are being developed not only to communicate, but also to protect privacy, e.g., in broadband networks (P tzmann and Waidner (1987) , P tzmann, P tzmann and Waidner (1991)), in mobile networks (Federrath, Jerichow and P tzmann (1996) ), in electronic commerce (Dukach (1992) , and Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) ), and in health insurance systems (Maxemchuk and Low (1995) ). The credit card protocol of Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) , for instance, uses cryptographic techniques to hide di erent pieces of transaction information from di erent parties involved in the transaction so that at the end of a credit card transaction, no single party except the cardholder can associate the cardholder's identity with where or what she purchases. Moreover it takes many parties to collude in order to compromise the cardholder's privacy.
One may think of a cryptographic protocol as de ning a process by which some information is transferred among some users and hidden from others. Solution of the collusion problem presented here can be applied to determine whether, and how, it is possible for a subset of users to discover the information that is to be hidden from them after or during a protocol's execution. An example is given in Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) .
It is not always possible for two users to collude. In order to collude they might have to share a unique piece of information pertaining to the protocol run. This may be a unique message that has been exchanged during that protocol run, or a unique piece of data. See x2.2 below for motivation of this requirement. We stress however that our formulation includes as a special case the situation where two users can collude as long as one knows the other, even if they share no unique message or data.
In we rst introduced a formal model for collusion analysis that consists of two phases in sequence: the protocol execution phase followed by a collusion phase. The protocol phase is modeled as a transition system and the collusion phase is modeled as another related transition system. We presented an algorithm there that completely solves the special case where two users can collude only if they shared a unique message that is exchanged during the protocol phase. That algorithm is extended in Low and Maxemchuk (1997) to solve the general case where users can collude on unique data as well as on unique messages.
In this paper we simplify our original formulation, and extend and provide proofs for these results. In the current formulation, the protocol phase is eliminated from the formal model and its e ect can be summarized by the initial state of the transition system modeling the collusion phase.
In x2, we present our model and formulate the collusion problem as a reachability analysis on a large transition system, exhaustive search on which is impractical. The state of the transition system represents the colluders' knowledge and a transition represents a two-party collusion that expands the receiver's knowledge. A solution to the collusion problem, called a collusion path, is a speci c way by which the colluders can uncover the hidden information. We show that the existence of a solution, as well as the construction of a collusion path, can be determined by examining just the initial knowledge of all the colluders. This eliminates the need to explore the large transition system. In x3 we treat the special case where collusion is allowed only between two colluders sharing unique messages. We prove a closed form expression specifying a condition under which a solution exists and clarify the simple structure of collusion paths. The result establishes that for a collusion problem to have a solution it is necessary and su cient that a subset of colluders exists such that the decrypted union of their initial knowledge contain the hidden information and that they share among them unique messages. This characterization leads to the algorithm that checks whether the condition is satis ed and if so computes a collusion path.
The special case illustrates the structure of the problem and leads to the solution for the general case where collusion is allowed between colluders sharing unique data as well. This is explained in x4. We prove an algorithm that determines whether a collusion path exists and if so, computes one. The algorithm includes the solution for the special case as its rst step.
The collusion path computed by our algorithm is not necessarily one that involves the minimum number of colluders. More generally suppose that a cost is incurred when a pair of users collude and that the cost of a collusion path is the sum of collusion costs associated with each pair of colluders on that path. We show in x5 that to nd a collusion path that involves the minimum number of colluders is NP-complete. This implies that the least cost collusion problem is NP-hard.
Cryptographic protocols are notoriously hard to design and their correctness is harder to prove (Simmons (1994) ). Numerous cryptographic protocols have been published and later found to contain security aws, see, e.g., Needham and Schroeder (1978) , Denning and Sacco (1981) , Needham and Schroeder (1987) , Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki and Newman (1989) , Simmons (1985) , Meadows (1991) , Moore (1988) , Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1990) . These often subtle failures do not require eroding the integrity of the underlying cryptoalgorithm and hence are weaknesses of the protocols. They clearly demonstrate the need for formal methods to verify cryptographic properties of protocols, such as the algebraic method of Dolev and Yao (1983) , and Dolev, Even and Karp (1982) to analyze the security of a class of public key protocols, the logic of Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1990) , and Gong, Needham and Yahalom (1990) to verify authentication protocols, and the state machine models of Millen (1984) , Kemmerer (1989) , Meadows (1991) , and Kemmerer, Meadows, and Millen (1994) to specify and automatically verify cryptographic protocols.
There are two important di erences between our work and earlier work on formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. First, previous work (Dolev and Yao (1983) , Dolev, Even and Karp (1982) , Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1990), Gong, Needham and Yahalom (1990) , and Kemmerer, Meadows, and Millen (1994) ) mostly veri es the security of a protocol, i.e., whether it ful lls its intended function. Given a secure protocol, we are concerned with how easy it is for a subset of protocol users to discover a target set of information through collusion. Second, as explained in x2 a collusion problem is de ned on a transition system, and hence can in principle be solved by exhaustive reachability search, as done in Millen (1984) , Kemmerer (1989), and Meadows (1991) . By exploiting the special structure of the collusion problem, however, our algorithm avoids searching the state space of the transition system, which can have 2 jUj(jUj?1) reachable states, and works on a graph with jUj nodes, where jUj is the number of colluders. This reduction in time complexity is important as large multiparty cryptographic protocols become common. We note that our algorithm supplements, and can be incorporated into, existing protocol analysis tools such as those in Millen (1984) , Kemmerer (1989), and Meadows (1991) .
Model and Problem Formulation
In this section we rst present our formal model and formulate the collusion problem. Then we remark on an possible application that motivated our work.
Notation
We use (y j ; j 2 J) to denote a vector with components y j , j spanning the index set J; the jth component y j is sometimes denoted y:j. 
Collusion Model
Consider a group of colluders, who have been involved in a protocol execution. Each colluder initially has a set of knowledge that includes a subset of messages that have been exchanged during a protocol run, the identity of some other colluders, a set of data, possibly multiply encrypted, and a set of cryptographic keys. The colluders' objective is to collectively discover a certain set of information. A colluder rst nds another colluder with which it can collude and then sends it its complete knowledge, including cryptographic keys in its possession. The recipient attempts to decrypt the combined knowledge with the keys it now has, and the process continues. We are interested in whether a given set of colluders can discover a target set of information. We now make these notions precise.
Collusion is carried out in an environment described by the quadruple (U; D; K; L) where 1. U is a set of colluders; 2. D is a nite set of data; 3. K is a nite set of cryptographic keys, including the identity key ; 4. L U D K is a set of information that determines whether two colluders can collude; see condition (6) below.
De ne the information set as the set of every possible encryption and clear text combination of every piece of information in the system:
Decryption is a function : 2 I ! 2 I that is de ned through the cancellation rule k ?1 k = k k ?1 = , the identity key, as the removal of encryption from a piece of encrypted data. 
i.e., the order in which a user receives and decrypts information is immaterial. The nal combined and reduced information is the same. Whenever we refer to a subset of I we always assume that it is in this reduced form. The knowledge set is the combination of the messages and information:
W := 2 N 2 I where N is the set of unique message identi ers and I is the information set. An element w = (w:N; w:I) of W represents a user's knowledge. It has two components: the rst component w:N N represents all the messages the user has seen, and the second component w:I I represents all the information the user knows. As noted above w:I is in reduced form. User u's knowledge is denoted w u 2 W. We naturally assume that u 2 w u :I for all u 2 U. 
i.e., the receiver's knowledge is expanded to include that of the sender. 
The conditions say that for s and r to collude, s must know r and they must either share a message (condition (5)) or a piece of data in L (condition (6)). Note that if L = U then since u 2 w u for all u, r 2 w s :I implies condition (6). Then the collusion prerequisites (5{6) reduce to the special case in which collusion is allowed as long as the sender s knows the receiver r.
To motivate the requirements (5{6) consider as an example an intermediary cx that forwards a piece of data to its recipient r in order to hide the identity of its sender s from r (Chaum (1981) ):
In the above s encrypts the (encrypted) data k r (d) and the recipient's identity r with a key k cx that can only be decrypted by the intermediary cx and sends them to cx (message 1). The intermediary cx then forwards the encrypted data to r (message 2), thus hiding the identity of the sender s from r. Variants of this simple protocol have been the building blocks of large cryptographic protocols to provide privacy in broadband networks (P tzmann and Waidner (1987) , P tzmann, P tzmann and Waidner (1991)), in credit card transactions (Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) ), and in mobile networks (Federrath, Jerichow and P tzmann (1996) ), where tra c volumes are high. After the above steps are carried out, cx knows w cx := (fmessage 1, message 2g, fs; cx; r; k ?1 cx ; k r (d)g) and r knows w r := (fmessage 2g, fcx; r; k ?1 r ; dg). For r to discover s, r must learn the information in w cx . In a large system however cx may have forwarded a large number of messages to the same recipient r in a short period of time and they have collected a large number of w cx and w r , corresponding to di erent protocol runs. Moreover the larger protocol of which the above is only a part can be implemented on a datagram network so that messages from di erent protocol runs may be interleaved at cx. Hence to combine the information in w cx and w r of the same protocol run, cx and r must share a unique piece of information pertaining to that protocol run. The unique message that is exchanged between cx and r can be used to pair up w cx and w r that belong to the same protocol run. This is modeled by condition (5). Sometimes two colluders can combine their knowledge pertaining to a particular protocol run if they share a piece of data. For instance two banks may have the unique social security number of a customer and hence can combine their knowledge about the customer. This is modeled by condition (6).
We call an event = (s; r) enabled in state w if the transition (w; ) is de ned; we often say that is enabled when the state from which the transition is made is understood.
Note that the set of users that can collude can increase as users collude and information is combined. For instance, a sender can have encrypted information that includes the identity of a user and a piece of data in L that the sender and that user share, and a receiver may have the key to decrypt that information. After the sender transfers its information to the receiver, the receiver can collude with the user that was hidden in the encrypted information.
We summarize our model in the following de nition. The transition system describes all the possible sequences of message exchanges among the colluders and how their knowledge evolves as collusion proceeds.
De nition 1 Given an environment (U; D, K, L), a collusion system is the (unique) transition system = (W jUj ; ; ) de ned above.
Problem formulation
The collusion problem is to determine if the colluders can combine their knowledge, by passing messages, and extract the hidden information. Suppose we have a collusion system = (W jUj ; ; ).
Collusion problem
Given an initial state w(0) 2 W jUj and a target set of unencrypted information T U D K, does there exist a path in that starts in w(0) and terminates in a state w( ) in which a colluder c 2 U knows T, i.e., w c ( ):I T?
We call in the de nition of the collusion problem a collusion path. It speci es which colluders should transmit to which other colluders and when.
The collusion problem is simply a reachability analysis on the state machine .
Given w(0), however, the set of reachable states in is a subset of all possible combinations of the colluders' initial knowledge, and contains up to 2 jUj(jUj?1) states. For example, for the simple protocol analysed in Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) , jUj = 8 and the reachable set contains up to 10 17 states. It is hence impractical to do an exhaustive search. In the next two sections we develop a solution that avoids exploring .
For the rest of this paper, we make the following natural assumption on the initial state w(0) of the collusion problem. We assume that in state w(0), if (u; v) is enabled because u and v share a message (condition (5)), then they must know each other in w(0) and hence (v; u) must also be enabled, i.e., w(0) satis es the condition: The motivation behind this assumption is that, in our setting, if u and v share a message, then they must have directly exchanged that message during protocol execution before collusion is carried out. Clearly the source of this exchange knows the destination. In almost all communication protocols the identity of the source is also included in the header of the message for error and ow control. Hence the source and destination of a direct message exchange always know the identity of each other after the exchange.
Henceforth x an environment (U; D; K; L), an initial state w(0) and a target information set T.
Example application
We now describe an example application that motivated this work. A cryptographic protocol is designed in Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) to implement anonymous credit cards in which a typical transaction involves the cardholder, the store where she makes a purchase, the cardholder's bank, the store's bank, and several intermediaries. At the end of a transaction no single participant, except the cardholder, knows both her identity and what she purchases. The question one might ask is which subsets of these participants (except the cardholder herself) must collude to associate the cardholder's identity and her purchase.
This question can be broken down into several subproblems, each involving a di erent subset of participants. Each subset de nes an environment (U; D; K; L) and a collusion problem, where the set U of colluders is the subset of participants under study and the target information T is cardholder's identity and her purchase. These collusion problems can be solved using the algorithm presented in the sequel and exhibit the potential vulnerabilities of the protocol to privacy protection; see Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) . In fact, by Theorem 4 below, we do not need to consider all possible subsets of participants, but only those subsets whose initial information, when combined, contains T.
3 Special case: L =
In this section we consider the special case in which L = , i.e., two users can collude only if they share a unique message that was exchanged during the protocol run (condition (5)).
It illustrates the structure of the problem and is useful to the solution of the general case, presented in the next section.
We solve this special case in two steps. In x3.1 we prove in Theorem 4 below that the collusion problem has a solution if and only if there is a set of colluders who have exchanged messages among themselves during protocol execution and whose initial information in state w(0), when combined, contains T. This means, in particular, that if the target information in T is distributed among clusters of users who have not communicated during protocol execution, then no user can discover the entire T regardless of what knowledge each user has. This theorem is proved through a sequence of lemmas.
Based on this characterization we present in x3.2 an algorithm that checks whether the condition is satis ed, and if so, computes a collusion path.
Solution characterization
The structure of a collusion path on the transition system can be better exhibited in terms of a collusion graph we now explain. Consider a path = (s 1 ; r 1 ) (s n ; r n ). We may also use to refer to the set of events = f(s t ; r t ); t = 1; : : : ; ng in the path, or the set of colluders = fs t ; r t ; t = 1; : : : ; ng; the meaning should be clear from the context. Hence bỳ (s; r) 2 ' and`c 2 ', we mean (s; r) = (s t ; r t ) and c = s t or r t , respectively, for some t. As noted above all paths are assumed to start from the given initial state w(0) unless otherwise speci ed. For any path in starting from w(0), w( ) denotes 's state after the transitions in have been made.
A path in can be equivalently speci ed by a labeled graph G = (V; E) where V are the nodes and E = f(u; v; t) j u; v 2 V; t 2 f1; : : : ; jEjgg is a set of directed edges from node u to node v labeled by t. The nodes represent colluders involved in the path and the edges represent messages among the colluders. The label on an edge indicates its relative transmission time. It is an important consideration because some events are not enabled until other messages have been transmitted. There can be multiple edges between two nodes in the same direction with di erent labels, corresponding to the same sender-receiver pair appearing multiple times in the path. Let (G) be the path in de ned by a sequentially labeled graph G such that each edge (u; v; t) 2 E corresponds to the event (u; v) and is the t-th event in (G). Similarly, let G( ) = (V ( ); E( )) be the unique labeled graph de ned by in , such that V ( ) = fc 2 g and E( ) = f(u; v; t) j (u; v) is the t-th event in g.
De nition 2 A labeled graph G is a valid graph if (G) is a path in ; it is a collusion graph if (G) is a collusion path.
Consider a path = (s 1 ; r 1 ) (s n ; r n ) with n events and the associated labeled graph G( ) = (V; E). A timed path (with respect to ) from node x to node y is a directed path in G( ) (x; u 1 ; t 1 ) (u k?1 ; y; t k ) starting at x and terminating at y such that 1 t 1 < < t k n. If there is a timed path from x to y, we call x a timed ancestor of y. Let A(y; ) denote the set of all timed ancestors of node y, with respect to . An example is given in Figure 1 .
The following useful lemma explains how to compute a colluder's knowledge after a path is followed. It says that a colluder c knows in state w( ) the decrypted union of the initial information of all, and only, its timed ancestors and c. To simplify notation de ne functions f 1 : 2 U ! 2 N and f 2 : 2 U ! 2 I by: for any subset A U of colluders, Proof. Let = (s 1 ; r 1 )(s 2 ; r 2 ) (s n ; r n ) consists of n events. We prove the lemma by induction on n. where we have used (1) twice in the second last equality. Hence the theorem holds for n = k + 1, and this completes the proof. 2
Minimal collusion paths, those on which no event can be omitted in order to complete the path in the same relative order, have especially simple structure. For a minimal collusion path , either ? (s t ; r t ) is not a path or it does not lead to the target information, i.e., T 6 w c ( ? (s t ; r t )):I for all c 2 . A minimal collusion path is not necessarily a collusion path with the minimum length. For instance, there may be a single user, which is not on the path, which has all of the information in T.
The next lemma says that on a minimal collusion path, every colluder is an ancestor of the last recipient, and only the last recipient knows the target information set.
Lemma 2 Suppose = (s 1 ; r 1 ) (s n ; r n ) is a minimal collusion path. Then (i) no c 2 except r n satis es T w c ( ):I; (ii) A(r n ; ) = , i.e., u 2 A(r n ; ) if and only if u 2 . Proof. Since is a collusion path there is some c 2 with w c ( ):I T. Suppose c 6 = r n satis es this property. Then w c ( ?(s n ; r n )):I = w c ( ):I T, contradicting the minimality of . Hence only r n knows T in state w( ).
Let G( ) = (V; E), V = , be 's collusion graph. The second claim asserts that V = A(r n ; ). By de nition of A(r n ; ) we have V A(r n ; ). Hence we only need to show that V A(r n ; ).
Consider the subgraph G 0 = (V 0 ; E 0 ) of G( ) induced by V 0 := A(r n ; ) V , where E 0 = f(s; r; t) j (s; r; t) is on a timed path in G( ) from some u 2 A(r n ; ) to r n g. We need to
show that V 0 = V . Suppose not, i.e., V 0 and E 0 are strict subsets of V and E, respectively.
We will construct a new collusion path 0 by removing some events from and keeping the relative order of the remaining events, hence contradicting the minimality of . obtained from by removing all edges not in E 0 . If 0 is a path, then since A(r n ; 0 ) = A(r n ; ), by Lemma 1, w rn ( 0 ):I = f 2 ( A(r n ; 0 )) = f 2 ( A(r n ; )) = w rn ( ):I T i.e., 0 is a collusion path. We hence only need to show that 0 is a path. Now the rst even (s 0 shows that the knowledge of s 0 t and r 0 t do not depend on transitions in 1 ; : : : ; t , and hence since is a path, so is 0 . Hence 0 is a collusion path, contradicting the minimality of . 2
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that w rn ( ):I, which contains the target information T, is the decrypted union of the initial information w u (0) in . Hence, to solve the collusion problem, it is necessary and su cient to nd a set of colluders whose initial information in state w(0), when combined, yields T and to nd a way for all of them to communicate their information to the same colluder. We now show that such a set of colluders must share unique messages among them in the initial state w(0). In the next subsection we will show how these colluders can combine their information. Lemma 3 Given any path = (s 1 ; r 1 ) (s n ; r n ), s t r t for t = 1; : : : ; n. Hence if is a minimal collusion path then the set = A(r n ; ) of colluders are all in the same connected component of F.
Proof. Let t = (s 1 ; r 1 ) (s t ; r t ) be the rst t events of , and w( t ) be the state of after t is followed starting from w(0). We prove by induction on t that all timed ancestors A(r t ; t ) of receiver r t belong to the same connected component of F. This then implies the rst assertion of the lemma since s t 2 A(r t ; t ). If is a minimal collusion path then, by Lemma 2(ii), = A(r n ; ). Then the above induction shows that colluders in are in the same connected component. Conversely suppose there is a collusion path . We can assume that it is minimal for otherwise we can make it minimal by removing redundant events from and keeping the remaining events in the same relative order. Lemma 3 then implies that is a connected component of F. Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that f 2 ( ) = ( u2 w u (0):I) T. 2
Algorithm
Theorem 4 speci es a condition under which a collusion graph exists. In general a collusion graph can take the form of any directed graph. The next result clari es the simple structure of collusion paths and leads to our algorithm. It says that every colluder, except the rst and the last, receive, decrypt, and forward exactly once.
Theorem 5 T. We will construct a valid graph G = (V; E 0 ) that consists of a simple path 1 that visits every node in V exactly once. By Lemma 1, the last recipient knows f 2 (V ) and hence T in the nal state, i.e., G is indeed a collusion graph.
Moreover, the corresponding collusion path (G) has the structure given in the theorem.
To construct G = (V; E 0 ), we only need to specify the set E 0 of edges. Let u 0 be any node in the connected component C. We will construct G to be a simple path that starts from u 0 and visits every node in V exactly once. Indeed it visits them in the same order as in a breadth-rst search on C starting from u 0 , but possibly with new edges not in C. Speci cally, let G 0 be a spanning tree of C rooted at u 0 . Let nodes in G 0 that are one hop away from u 0 be u 11 ; u 12 ; : : : u 1k 1 , those that are two hops away from u 0 be u 21 ; u 22 ; : : : u 2k 2 , and so on. Then the graph G, speci ed as a path, is (u 0 ; u 11 ; 1) (u 11 ; u 12 ; 2) (u 1(k 1 ?1) ; u 1k 1 ; k 1 ) (u 1k 1 ; u 21 ; k 1 + 1) (u 21 ; u 22 ; k 1 + 2) until all nodes in C are visited. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . We need to show that G is a valid graph.
The rst edge (u 0 ; u 11 ; 1) is valid by the choice of u 0 and u 11 . For edges (u 1i ; u 1(i+1) ; i+ 1), note that u 0 and each u 1(i+1) share a unique message in w(0) by de nition of C. After the rst i events, u 1i 's knowledge includes that of u 0 . Hence u 1i knows u 1(i+1) and shares a unique message with u 1(i+1) (even though u 1(i+1) does not necessarily know u 1i ). Thus the edge (u 1i ; u 1(i+1) ; i + 1) is valid. For the edge (u 1k 1 ; u 21 ; k 1 + 1), note that u 21 shares a unique message with some u 1i . Since u 1k 1 's knowledge includes that of u 1i after the rst k 1 events, u 1k 1 knows u 21 (not necessarily vice versa) and shares a unique message with u 21 . Hence the edge (u 1k 1 ; u 21 ; k 1 + 1) is valid. Other edges are valid following a similar argument. This completes the proof.
2
Theorems 4 and 5 suggest the following algorithm to solve the collusion problem.
It rst constructs the graph F that speci es all events that are initially enabled. Then it nds each connected component of F using breadth-rst search while, at the same time, constructing a candidate collusion path that visits every node in the connected component. The path has the same structure as in Theorem 5 and the construction follows that in its proof. Theorem 4 then guarantees that the collusion problem has a solution if and only if such a collusion path can be found.
The algorithm maintains several data structures. The adjacent lists Adj v] represent the graph F. The variable discovered v] stores the status of a node v in F. It is initialized to be no and becomes yes after it is discovered by the breadth-rst search. Q is a queue of nodes and head Q] is the node at the head of the queue. A node is appended to the end of Q when it is rst discovered and removed from the queue when all its neighbors have been discovered. The variable stores the path under construction and last stores the last node visited by . The algorithm extends , whenever possible, by a directed edge from last to a newly discovered node.
Finally the algorithm initializes a list GROUP of pairs ( ; i), where denotes a path or a set of colluders on the path, depending on context, and i 2 I is the combined information of colluders in . GROUP is empty on entry of the algorithm; when returned it contains a pair ( ; i) for each connected component of F, with the interpretation that is a path that visits every colluder in the connected component and i is the information of the last recipient if is followed. The list GROUP will be used to solve the general case in the next section. 
General case: L
In the last section we show how to solve the collusion problem for the special case where collusion is allowed only on unique messages. In this section we solve the general case where collusion is allowed on data in L as well.
The condition under which a solution exists is no longer a simple expression as in Theorem 4 for the special case, but it can still be determined from just the initial state w(0). We present Algorithm 2 below that veri es if a solution exists and if so, computes a collusion path. Indeed the algorithm uses Algorithm 1 of the last section as its rst step. If a collusion path exists that involves only colluders who share unique messages in state w(0) (i.e., in the same connected component of F), then Algorithm 1 will identify it.
Otherwise any collusion path must involve two colluders that are in di erent components of F. Such collusion can occur only if these two colluders share a piece of data in L when they collude. As Algorithm 2 proceeds knowledge of di erent connected components of F is combined, whenever possible, by constructing a path that visits every node in these components. Algorithm 2 stops either when a collusion path is found or no further combination is possible (in which case the collusion problem has no solution). We now describe the algorithm in more detail.
Recall the graph F that describes all events that are initially enabled in w(0). The algorithm starts by calling Algorithm 1 to identify a connected component of F whose combined initial information contains the target information set T. If it succeeds it returns a collusion path. Otherwise Algorithm 1 will have initialized the data structure GROUP to specify, for each connected component of F, a path through all nodes in the connected component and their combined initial information. To simplify exposition in what follows we assume that each connected component of F has more than a single node. The results can be easily extended to allow single-node components as well.
For any path the variable tail ] represents the last recipient on . At any time, an element ( ; i) of GROUP identi es a group of colluders, a path that visits every colluder in the group and the combined initial information i = f 2 ( ) = ( u2 w u (0):I) of the group. The last recipient tail ] knows i when is followed. Immediately after Algorithm 1 returns without nding a collusion path, each element of GROUP corresponds to a connected component of F. As Algorithm 2 proceeds these elements are`combined' to form bigger and fewer groups, until either a collusion path is found or no further combination is possible. The collusion problem has no solution in the latter case. By combining we mean construction of a path, from the spanning paths of the two individual connected components, that visits every colluder in both components, as explained next.
Lemma 3 implies that two colluders in di erent connected components of F can collude only if they share a piece of data in L (condition (6) is added, and the search repeats. When no further elements in GROUP can combine their information the algorithm concludes that the collusion problem has no solution and returns nil. We now present the algorithm. Recall that denotes a path or the set of colluders involved in the path, depending on the context. 
Return (nil).
The correctness of the algorithm is guaranteed by the following theorem. Proof. If there is a connected component of F whose combined initial information contains T, then Algorithm 1 will return a collusion path and Algorithm 2 terminates in step 2.
Otherwise Algorithm 1 will return the linked list GROUP that contains one element for each connected component of F. Each time the`while' loop in step 3 is entered, the linked list GROUP is shortened by one. Hence Algorithm 2 must terminate, either inside thè while' loop with a collusion path, or in step 4 with nil. We are left to show that the collusion problem has a solution if and only if a collusion path is returned.
Suppose Algorithm 2 terminates in step 3 with a 12 . Then i 12 T. Hence to show that 12 is a collusion path, we will show by induction on n, the number of times the`while' loop is entered, that 12 is a path in and that its last recipient knows i 12 .
Consider n = 1. As proved in the last section 1 and 2 are paths in and their last recipients know i 1 and i 2 , respectively. We show portion by portion that 12 is a path. To show that 2 (tail( 2 ); v) is a path, note that v 2 2 and hence v 2 w tail( 2 ) ( 2 ):I. Moreover 6 = w v ( 2 ):N w tail( 2 ) ( 2 ):N since v and tail( 2 ) are in the same connected component of F. Hence the event (tail( 2 ); v) is enabled in state w( 2 ), i.e., 2 (tail( 2 ); v) is a path. Since 1 is a path starting from state w(0), so is it starting from state w( 2 (tail( 2 ); v) ), i.e, 2 (tail( 2 ); v) 1 is a path. Finally since tail( 1 ) knows i 1 and v knows i 2 , the condition guarding the entry to the`while' loop guarantees that the last event (tail( 1 ); v) is enabled in state w( 2 (tail( 2 ); v) 1 ). Hence 12 is a path; moreover its last recipient v knows i 12 = (i 1 i 2 ).
When n > 1, tail( 2 ) and v may be in di erent connected components of F; yet the event (tail( 2 ); v) is still enabled because the set of message identi ers that tail( 2 ) has includes those that v has as v 2 2 . With this observation the same argument as for n = 1 goes through to show that 12 is a path and that its last recipient v knows i 12 = (i 1 i 2 ).
Hence when the algorithm terminates in step 3, 12 is a collusion path.
Conversely suppose a collusion path exists; without loss of generality we may assume that is minimal. We now show that a 12 can be constructed according to the recipe in step 3. Hence the algorithm cannot terminate with a nil. The collusion path must involve nodes that belong to di erent connected components of F, for otherwise, there is a connected component of F whose combined initial information contains T and Algorithm 1 would have returned a collusion path. Hence suppose the set of colluders in belongs to two connected components of F; the argument can be easily extended to the case where involves more than two connected components. Let = (s 1 ; r 1 )(s 1 ; r 1 ) (s n ; r n ). Since is minimal only the last recipient r n knows T by Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, suppose that the two connected components correspond to ( 1 ; i 1 ) and ( 2 ; i 2 ) of GROUP after Algorithm 1 terminates and before step 3 is entered for the rst time. Suppose that in each of the rst k ? 1 events of both the sender and the receiver belong to the same connected component of F, and (s k ; r k ) is the rst event that crosses between the two components, i.e., s k 2 1 and r k 2 2 , say. We claim that the path 12 so constructed from 1 and 2 in step 3 would have been a collusion path.
To see this, let k?1 be the rst k ? 1 events of . Since (s k ; r k ) is enabled after k?1 has been followed, we must have Therefore 12 can be constructed as speci ed in step 3. Moreover 1 2 by choice of 1 and 2 , and hence i 12 = (i 1 i 2 ) f 2 ( ) T, i.e., 12 is indeed a collusion path.
Finally it is possible that the execution of the algorithm combines one of the two elements, say ( 1 ; i 1 ), with some other elements, instead of combining it with ( 2 ; i 2 ). In this case since information of colluders can only increase the new combined element of GROUP remains eligible to be combined with ( 2 ; i 2 ). Hence the algorithm must eventually terminate either with a collusion path that involves colluders in 1 2 or some other collusion path. This completes our proof.
5 Least Cost Collusion
Suppose a cost is incurred when a pair of users collude. In this section we present the negative result that the problem of determining a collusion path that incurs the least cost, when one exists, is NP-hard. This problem is of interest for two reasons. First it is usually impossible to completely eliminate successful collusion. For instance if every participant colludes any information can be uncovered. Hence it might be more practical to design protocols that eliminate successful collusions that are inexpensive. Second cryptographic protocols are used to keep information apart in order to protect privacy. However it may sometimes be necessary to link information, e.g., for law enforcement purposes or to uncover an audit trail, by forcing protocol participants to collude. It is then desirable to determine a collusion path that incurs the least cost.
The algorithms presented earlier determine whether the collusion problem has a solution and produces a collusion path when it does, but the collusion path produced is generally not the least-cost one. For instance the algorithm in x3 constructs a collusion path that visits every node in a connected component of the graph F, even when a subset of the colluders in the connected component su ces. This is illustrated in Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) .
To narrow our problem, we will consider the special case considered in x3 where L = . We argue that the algorithm there is polynomial and hence can be rst used to determine a connected component of graph F from which a collusion path can be constructed, if any. We will show that, even for the special case where L = , determining the least cost collusion is NP-hard with respect to this connected component. 
and hence a collusion path can be determined from G. Suppose for each pair (u; v) 2 E, collusion between them costs c(u; v) in either direction. We are interested in the following decision problem. Recall that the environment for the collusion problem is (U; D; K; L = ).
Least-cost Collusion instance: A connected component G = (V; E) of F, initial state (w u (0); u 2 V ) for nodes in V , target information set T, such that (14) is satis ed; an integer k.
question: Does there exist a collusion path such that the total collusion cost P (u;v)2 c(u; v) is less than k?
To show that the least-cost collusion problem is NP-hard, we consider a special case where c(u; v) = c, independent of (u; v). Then the total collusion cost P 
and jV 0 j k?
In the de nition of the minimum collusion path problem we only need to identify a connected subgraph of G with the smallest number of colluders. Application of the polynomial algorithm in x3 to the subgraph will then yield a collusion path that involves the minimum number of colluders. When collusion costs are equal it is also the least-cost path. Hence the minimum collusion path problem is indeed a special case of the least-cost collusion problem. We now show that the minimum collusion path problem is NP-complete, by reducing the well-known NP-complete set-covering problem to it.
Theorem 8 Suppose that the veri cation of the condition (B) T takes polynomial time. Then the minimum collusion path problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We will rst show that the minimum collusion path problem is in the class NP. Then we will show how to reduce any instance of the set-covering problem to an instance of the minimum collusion path problem. Since the minimum set-covering problem is NP-complete, the theorem will be proved.
Given a candidate subgraph G 0 = (V 0 ; E 0 ) of G, we only need to verify condition (15) and that jV 0 j k. Both can be done in polynomial time under the assumption of the theorem. Hence the least-cost collusion problem can be veri ed in polynomial time and is therefore in NP.
An instance (X; X; l) of the set-covering problem (see Cormen, Leiserson and Rivest, Chapter 37 (1993) ) consists of a nite set X and a family X of subsets of X, such that every element of X belongs to at least one subset in X. The question is to nd a subset Y X such that X = C2Y C (16) and that jYj l. Given an instance (X; X; l) of the set-covering problem, construct the following instance (G; w(0); T; k) of the minimum collusion path. Let G = (V; E) be a fully connected undirected graph that has a node v for every subset X(v) of X in X. Hence the set-covering problem can be reduced to the minimum collusion path problem. Moreover the reduction takes polynomial time. Hence the minimum collusion path problem is NP-complete.
2
Since the minimum collusion problem is a special case of the least cost collusion problem, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 9 The least cost collusion problem is NP-hard.
Conclusion
We have formulated a collusion problem that determines whether a group of colluders can collectively discover a target set of unencrypted information starting from their initial knowledge. We have designed a simple algorithm that determines whether a collusion problem has a solution and when it does, computes a collusion path.
We view a cryptographic protocol as de ning a process by which information is transferred among some users and hidden from others. The algorithm presented here can be applied to determine whether a subset of protocol users can discover, through collusion, the information that is to be hidden from them during or after a protocol's execution. An example is given in Low, Maxemchuk and Paul (1996) .
Our algorithm does not necessarily compute a collusion path that involves the minimum number of colluders. We have shown, however, that this problem is NP-complete. More generally, suppose there is a collusion cost associated with each pair of colluders. We have shown that the least-cost collusion problem is NP-hard.
